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STEPPING OUT OF THE COMPETING CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS CONUNDRUM: A COMPARATIVE HARM ANALYSIS
TIFFANI LENNON
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has not developed a way to iden-
tify and balance competing constitutional rights.' Instead, the Court2 has
relied upon three-part tests, tiers of scrutiny and levels of review, along
with unreasoned morality rhetoric in upholding or rejecting competing
interests. 3 These tests or levels of review attempt to create a neutral
Court, blind to differentiating characteristics such as race, gender and
socio-economic status. Neutrality or objectivity is intended to eliminate
personal interpretations and biases in the name of justice. The Court's
neutrality tests have become doctrine, yet none of them have actually
removed or minimized biases and inequities-a crucial flaw.4 In fact,
these tests have created further inequities because they fail to address and
explore the underlining problem, and they have not provided meaningful
guidance and direction to the lower federal courts.5 This need for bias
t J.D., M.A.-International Studies and Intercultural Communication; University of Denver,
2004. Attorney specializing in individual constitutional rights. Special thanks to Professors Julie A.
Nice and Ann Scales.
1. E.g., Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1317 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out
that competing claims were not identified).
2. I will refer primarily to the cases of the United States Supreme Court, yet when I suggest
employing a comparative harm analysis I am speaking more broadly to the federal judiciary. I ex-
pand the conversation more broadly because the federal courts are usually the only federal expertise
reviewing constitutional rights cases. Whereas it is preferred that the Court sets the national stan-
dards for constitutional review, lower federal courts review most constitutional cases thus the discus-
sion cannot be limited to the Supreme Court. See Edward Purcell, Reconsidering the Frankfurterian
Paradigm: Reflections on Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 682
(1999) (critiquing Justice Frankfurter, who posited that the lower federal courts serve as an in-take
office for the U.S. Supreme Court thereby indirectly regulating the types of cases that will be heard),
Purcell, and many others, criticizes Frankfurter for misunderstanding the role of the lower federal
courts and for overemphasizing the role of the Court. Id. at 688. I will also embark on the same
"misunderstood" journey placing too much emphasis on the Court, yet I do so for the purpose of
arguing for a national standard of review that would be best established by the Supreme Court.
3. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (establishing a three-part test to balance
First Amendment and community interests); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995) (applying strict scrutiny to all racial classifications); Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432 (1985) (applying rationality review to disabled persons because such persons neither fell
into a racial classification, which receives strict scrutiny, nor did such persons fall into the gender
classification, which receives intermediate scrutiny); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(arguing that upholding dominant societal mores is sufficient to withhold constitutional protection).
4. See Purcell, supra note 2. Purcell claims that this desired neutrality and objectivity failed.
Id. at 686.
5. See id. at 724.
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minimization is essential in order to overcome systematic inequities. This
article sets forth the notion that only through discourse6 will judges act as
fair arbiters. The elimination or minimization of personal biases is
important particularly when competing claims arise.
Systematic inequities are most visible when constitutional claims
compete because the Court is able to reach a decision without explicitly
identifying the competition, thereby glossing over the tension. As a re-
suit, the Court is faced with a conundrum when opposing parties bring
valid yet competing rights claims. One party's claim is often ignored and
not adequately articulated, usually the claim from a person who is mar-
ginalized or from a disliked group.
7
Competing claims arise because law and society are intimately in-
terwoven. 8 When an individual exercises his or her liberties, there exists
a possibility that the exercise of liberty will result in a deprivation to
another. Individuals and groups seek to remedy the harm inflicted upon
them by an opposing party. When a law or party adversely affects a per-
son or group, that person or group claims harm. Harm is a ubiquitous
claim placing responsibility on someone or something. The Court has
attempted to use the notion of harm to resolve constitutional claims al-
though it has not provided insight into what harm is or when it is permis-
sible to trump constitutional rights.
This notion of harm is seen in various constitutional contexts from
commerce and morality to the First Amendment. An understanding of
harm is particularly important in equality claims where the impact of the
discriminatory action is not overtly visible. The most common legal sce-
nario involves a member of a marginalized group who attempts to gain
an equal share of constitutional pie at the perceived expense of another.
9
This creates a challenge for the courts because each party claims harm.
The courts must determine whose claim will prevail. As the Court articu-
lated in Lawrence v. Texas, 1° a just society cannot allow the majority's
6. This is often referred to as ethical or moral discourse but it is not intended to refer to
societal norms or personal mores. Instead, ethical discourse is the process in which judges engage in
dialogue about the constitutional values at issue and challenge their own internal biases. Through
this discourse, reasoned, non-discriminatory analysis emerges, i.e. ethical and moral dialogue. See
JURGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS, 17, 30,
84 (Ciaran R. Cronin, trans., The MIT Press 1993) (1990).
7. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557 (1995) (upholding the exclusion of gays and lesbians from participating in a St. Patrick's Day
parade); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (rejecting that equality of the laws
would trump an organization's right to freely associate with non-gays).
8. See generally LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985)
(discussing how the intention of law is to impact society). Indeed, the legal system was created in
this country for societal purposes, particularly to distribute property for economic vitalization and to
maintain the class stratification of society. Id. at 177-88, 488-93 (referring to laws that limited
women's and African-Americans' access to power).
9. Constitutional pie is used here as in pieces, which make up a bundle of rights within the
"pie" and not finite pieces intended to be shared by all.
10. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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values to infringe upon the rights of a minority group." The Court must
strike an adequate balance between competing rights in order to uphold
the Constitution. Generally, two types of competing claims arise.
The first type surfaces when one's liberty claim trumps another's
equality claim, or when two liberty claims collide.1 2 An example of this
first type includes free speech versus equal protection claims between
private actors. 13 The second type occurs when governmental actions are
at issue. This conflict is more accurately described as a competition be-
tween constitutional principles.' 4 Implicit and explicit principles include
those that can be found based upon the structure and text of the Constitu-
tion. 15 For example, courts give great deference to military policy-
making. Courts and those supporting deference argue that the structure of
the Constitution limits judicial review of military action because it is
essential to national security. 16 They claim that the federal and state gov-
ernments possess a compelling interest that should withstand intrusion
11. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 (reaffirming that the law cannot be used to suppress a
minority group and impose the dominating group's values on them). The terms majority and minor-
ity are used to refer to the quantity of individuals belonging to each group, i.e. the number of hetero-
sexuals is larger than the number of gays and lesbians.
12. See generally Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (denying equal protection of the laws where equality
would trump the First Amendment); Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (upholding equality
over First Amendment rights). The idea that a liberty claim, in particular the First Amendment, must
trump other amendments in order to preserve equality is erroneous. Equality and liberty are inter-
changeable, and without one, the other fails to exist effectively. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
To illustrate, those involved in the civil rights movement of the 1960's had to violate segregation
laws in order to protest segregation. Tsahai Tafari, The Rise and Fall of Jim Crow, Public Broadcast
Station, at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/jimcrow/strugglecourt.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2005). The
First Amendment protection did not apply to African-Americans, who were deemed second-class
citizens, because they were not afforded full equality. Id.
13. Private equality claims will not be addressed as something distinct and separate from
public claims because private deprivations are no less severe or injurious than governmental in-
fringement of equality. See Charles R. Lawrence lfl, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 444-49. Further, the Court has applied constitutional prin-
ciples to both private and public actors somewhat consistently. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. 609
(1984); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (holding private actions were subjected to constitu-
tional scrutiny).
14. Article III of the U.S. Constitution grants judicial review of competing constitutional
claims because such claims are of national concern and incorporate the values of the Constitution.
"Article H is not to be read out of the Constitution; rather, it should be read as expressing one value
that must be balanced against competing constitutional values and legislative responsibilities. This
Court retains the final word on how that balance is to be struck." N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 113 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (referring to the competing and
implicit structural principles of the Constitution). See also Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389,
407-08 (holding that issues involving national concerns are appropriate for federal courts).
15. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 407-08. See also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS 9-13 (1999) (explaining that thick constitutional principles involve struc-
tural arguments such as federalism and comity).
16. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 926-27 (1996) (finding that Article I of the Constitution
grants Congress military power, and thus, military deference is consistent with constitutional princi-
ples). But see Ann Scales, Militarization: The Jurisprudence of the Military-industrial Complex, 1
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 541, 551-52 (2003) [hereinafter Militarization].
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
from the courts.' 7 As a result, military deference and national security
have trumped individual rights and protections.18
In both types of claims, the Court has failed to identify competing
tensions, and has not developed a sufficient analytical framework for
balancing them.' 9 It is essential to acknowledge that both harms exist in
order to bring to light the constitutional rights at issue. The Court, as
supreme arbiter of the Constitution, must determine which claim will
prevail. This article seeks to begin the discussion to resolve the compet-
ing tensions, and in doing so, suggests a comparative harm analysis. A
comparative harm analysis should be applied across the spectrum when-
ever constitutional interests compete; however, for illustrative purposes
this article will focus on the conflict between equality and liberty.
This article will first explore the reluctance to equally distribute
constitutional rights. Second, this article will outline the Court's harm
analyses and the rationale behind them in various constitutional contexts
including the Dormant Commerce Clause and First Amendment cases. In
exploring the harm analyses used by the Court, it was discovered that the
Court often relied on unreasoned morality rhetoric, which the Court ul-
timately rejected, and eventually grew to adopt and accept causative fac-
tors directly linking the harm to action at issue. Third, a comparative
harm analysis will be suggested to resolve competing constitutional
claims. A comparative harm analysis seeks to identify valid constitu-
tional infringements. This article argues for the implementation of rea-
soned, practical discourse in evaluating and balancing competing claims,
and rejects the Court's implicit notion of proving causative harms. This
article also presumes that both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due
Process Clause establish a non-discriminatory policy.
20
17. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 926-27.
18. See id.; see also Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Club v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549
(1987).
19. The rationale behind military or congressional deference is to prevent unwarranted judi-
cial interference. U.S. Americans have historically been skeptical about any form of governmental
encroachment since our early inception, and understandably so. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8.
"[Fireedom of expression has greater value in a political context ... and therefore more conducive to
finding a fair and just compromise between the two competing values..." Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R.
at 737. However, we seem to allow government interference when we need to prevent intrusion
most. For example, military and congressional deference allows governmental intrusion into our
fundamental liberties. See, e.g., O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Thomasson, 80 F.3d 915. Yet, the Court and the Third Circuit
failed to review the competing rights claims in the cases cited above because it believed the Execu-
tive and Legislature have exclusive, non-reviewable authority to act. Id. The separation of powers
doctrine requires the Court to review competing constitutional claims that involve explicit rights and
implicit principles. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
20. See Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence: Recog-
nizing the Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209, 1222 (suggest-
ing that the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause favor non-discrimination in both the intent
and/or effects of legislation and private actions) [hereinafter The Emerging Third Strand]. This
presumption is made despite Justice Scalia's claim that the Equal Protection Clause has reached "full
maturity" or complete stagnation. lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587-89.
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE RESISTANCE TO SHARE THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PIE
A. Power and Security Theory in Legal Discourse
Political economic scholars employ comparative analysis theories in
understanding conflicting interests and power structures. For example,
Kenneth Waltz explores one state's need to discriminate against an-
other.21 Usually the discriminating state possesses more power or domi-
nance.22 The powerful seek to impose their value system on the less
powerful, while the less powerful resist those values.23 Waltz concludes
that the powerful seek to maintain their existing status and perceive the
opposing state as a threat.24 Therefore, the dominant ones reason that the
opposition must be eliminated or suppressed in order for the powerful to
prevail, according to Waltz.25 Waltz criticizes these discriminating states
for failing to understand how diversity can produce greater (economic)
26
gains.
Whereas Waltz uses this theory to understand nation states and their
economic structure, this is also the scenario usually played out when
constitutional claims conflict. I posit that this same theory can transcend
political economic discourse and apply to law and society. The discrimi-
nating or dominating group perceives the opposition as harmful and
threatening.27 The group will often achieve societal concurrence by fuel-
ing an irrational fear.28 In some scenarios, the fear is valid, while in oth-
ers, the fear is irrational. For instance, dominant groups fear their fall
from power, while the subordinate ones fear domination. 29 A group's
success in maintaining or overcoming dominance relies largely upon
societal consent.30 Thus, either group must have ideological buy-in or
21. See generally KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1959);
KENNETH WALTZ, LAWS AND THEORIES 27-46 (Koehane ed., 1986).
22. KENNETH WALTZ, LAWS AND THEORIES 27-46 (Koehane ed., 1986).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 35-40.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 46.
27. Id. at 27-46.
28. Id.
29. Interestingly, many political economists through examining history conclude that domi-
nating others in an effort to resist perceived vulnerabilities will ironically lead to that exact result,
i.e. loss of power and a weak state because as a group grows larger and more powerful others begin
to question the legitimacy of the dominant, and the less powerful seek to weaken them. BENJAMIN J.
COHEN, THE QUESTION OF IMPERIALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DOMINANCE AND
DEPENDENCE 229-57 (1973); STEPHEN D. KRASNER, STRUCrURAL CONFLICT: THE THIRD WORLD
AGAINST GLOBAL LIBERALISM 32-58 (1985); David A. Lake, Power and the Third World: Toward a
Realist Political Economy of North South Relations, 31 INT'L STUDIES Q. 217 (1987).
30. See generally Stephen R. Gill & David Law, Global Hegemony and the Structural Power
of Capital, 33 INT'L STUDIES Q. 475 (1989); Stephen Gill & David Law, Global Hegemony and the
Structural Power of Capital, in GRAMSCI, HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 93-124 (Stephen Gill ed., 1993).
2004]
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consent from society, or at least key members of society, in order to re-
ceive credibility, legitimacy and security.
The legal discourse between the gay rights and anti-gay movements
exemplifies the power and security theory. In Romer v. Evans,31 the pro-
ponents of Amendment 2 sought to restrict gays and lesbians from ac-
cessing the political process in an effort to conserve the resources of the
state for more valued groups. 32  The proponents informed voters-
predominantly heterosexuals, people of color and the religious-that
queers threatened their legal and societal status.33 They sought concur-
rence by perpetuating a perceived harm and explained that Amendment 2
would preserve the voters' legal rights.34 The voters responded and au-
thorized the State of Colorado to legally discriminate against gays, lesbi-
ans and bisexuals. The voters believed the harm-political protection of
queers-not only existed but also threatened them.
35
B. Survival Theory and Discrimination
The survival theory explains a related yet distinct reason private ac-
tors and the government seek to distribute burdens in an onerous way.
Unlike the power and security theory where dominant groups and indi-
viduals seek to uphold and maintain power, the survival theory seeks to
maintain sameness. The survival theory posits that a discriminating
group seeks to preserve its own existence by preventing those who pos-
sess different belief systems from affecting change. 36 Those who dis-
criminate believe they need to maintain homogeneity in order for their
ideals to survive. The survival theory is often at the crux of most compet-
ing claims, and it explains why some groups advance arguments insuffi-
ciently grounded in constitutional law. As a result, this theory will be
examined further in several contexts below.
In examining religious and cultural survival, Professor Thomas
Giegerich explains that the United States government historically used
both religion and property to discriminate and promote homogeneity.
37
He argues that the promotion of religion and culture directly conflict
with liberty and equality. 38 This conflict exists because the promotion of
sameness is in opposition with individuality. Giegerich also concludes
that homogeneity does more than merely perpetuate survival of the most
31. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
32, Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
33. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994).
34. Evans, 882 P.2d at 1340.
35. See id.
36. See S.I. Strong, Romer v. Evans and the Permissibility of Morality Legislation, 39 ARLz.
L. REV. 1259, 1283-86, 1298-1300 (1997) (arguing that the survival theory erroneously presumes
that minority groups will corrupt the majority).
37. Thomas Giegerich, Freedom of Religion as a Source of Claims to Equality and Problems
for Equality, 34 ISR. L REV. 211, 212 (2000).
38. Id. at 214.
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powerful groups. Homogeneity, Giegerich opines, fosters authoritative
and totalitarian regimes. 39 Whereas homogeneity is essential for perpetu-
ating survival of the most powerful, pluralism is essential for perpetuat-
ing equality, liberty, and thus individualism.
4
0
In offering his explanation of why the United States relies upon
homogeneity, Professor John S. Baker4' references Plato and Socrates,
like many conservative pundits, in making his argument.42 Believing
James Madison interpreted Greek philosophy similarly when Madison
helped structure the Constitution, Baker referenced Federalist Ten as his
evidence to support his belief that the U.S. federalist structure allows for
the delicate balance between giving the minority a voice while giving
power to the majority.43
Baker explains that the majority holds the key to morality and virtu-
ous conduct.44 The U.S. government permits some individualism in order
to allow limited expression and to prevent civil uprisings and cultural
wars from occurring.45 Baker also states that the minority is not meant to
46have power. According to Baker, minority power would promote ram-
pant individualism, and consequently, the downfall of society, whereas
giving power to the majority preserves the virtue and mores of society.47
This, he says, is "brilliant" because society needs homogeneity of ideals
and morals in order to survive.48 Homogeneity will allow the United
States to continue its economic and cultural superiority.4 9 In other words,
Baker posits that the federal government needs to protect moral majorita-
rism, but should do so quietly in order not to cause a minority uprising. 5°
39. Id. at 219.
40. Id.
41. John S. Baker, Louisiana State University law professor, Lecture to the University of
Denver College of Law (Oct. 9, 2003).
42. Strong, supra note 36, at 1268-80 (explaining that conservatives rely upon Plato and
Aristotle in arguing for moral majoritarism). In his reference to Greek philosophers, I posit that
Baker and others ignore the 6th Century B.C.E. founder of Greek philosophy and culture. By ignor-
ing the founder, Sappho of Lesvos, Baker neglects the very foundation of Greek philosophy begin-
ning some 300 years before Socrates and Plato. COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2512-13 (6th ed. 2000).
Sappho, in the midst of tragedy, calls for humanity. She foreshadows that survival depends upon the
love and tolerance of humankind, which furthers the advancement of civility by engaging in natural
"law" instead of resisting it. Natural law refers to the innate propensity to pursue physical, emotional
and spiritual desires. History erroneously refers to Sappho as only a poet. Perhaps this erroneous
reference can be best explained by Baker's contention that majoritarism must prevail in order to
"preserve" society.
43. John S. Baker, Louisiana State University law professor, Lecture to the University of
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Baker explains his position against same sex relations by proclaim-
ing that only small communities can foster virtue. The family unit, de-
fined as man, woman and child, populates the type of small community
in danger most often. 51 When minorities threaten significant and essential
morals, such as upholding the values of the traditional family, the federal
government needs to proclaim and define acceptable conduct.52 Yet, in
less severe circumstances, Baker suggests that the federal government
should refrain from engaging in cultural wars, and the judiciary should
refrain from engaging in political questions.
53
Despite Baker's support for homogeneity and oppression, he pos-
sesses a worthwhile suggestion: balance. Unfortunately, Baker would
favor implicit religious and cultural dominance in order to strike the
"balance." 54 Giegerich also favors balance, yet cautions against religious
and cultural dominance since such dominance leads to authoritarian re-
gimes.55 Giegerich encourages the balancing of equality and liberty for
they are both "partners and competitors.'
56
Professor Julie Nice, much like Giegerich, argues that the tensions
articulated above serve as partners as well as competitors. Professor Nice
best captures the current tension by describing ten antinomies, or contra-
dictions, that result from the Court's two-strand, equal protection analy-
sis. 57 Nice also emphasizes that the first antinomy, assimilation and sub-
ordination, ultimately explains the remaining nine antinomies, in that the
struggle for power causes legal discourse.58 As a result of the discourse,
contradicting legal theories or antinomies emerge. The contradicting
theories either will perpetuate subordination by encouraging assimilation
or disrupt subordination by welcoming heterogeneity. Nice illustrates
that assimilation promotes homogeneity and thus perpetuates subordina-
tion."
The power and survival theories are, in their most definitive transla-
tion, the rationale for maintaining dominant, homogenous legal structures
51. Id. As an aside, from a global perspective, the United States is a "small" community




55. Giegerich, supra note 37, at 219.
56. Id. at 212.
57. Julie A. Nice, Equal Protection's Antinomies and the Promise of a Co-Constitutive Ap-
proach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1392, 1394-96 (2000). The Court relies on a two-strand test to deter-
mine whether the Equal Protection Clause applies: fundamental right and suspect class. Id. at 1419-
20.
58. Id. at 1394.
59. ld. at 1413. Nice argues for the disruption of hierarchical power relations and suggests the
implementation of the third strand: the co-constitutive approach. The third strand resolves the Equal
Protection Clause's antinomies by examining the relationship between the class and the right, and
the effects of the discriminatory law on society. Id. at 1421-22.
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designed to keep power vested in the hands of a few. 6 0 The law, from its
very inception in the United States, has been used consistently to main-
tain and distribute power (and wealth) in society.61 By so doing, the
powerful individuals are able to survive or maintain their positions by
structuring the laws in a way that prohibit the disruption of that power
scheme.62 This article seeks to overcome the inherent dominant power
structure, and preserve liberty and equality in their unadulterated form.
Yet, the Court must first overtly acknowledge and identify valid compet-
ing liberty and equality claims.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S USE OF HARM ANALYSES
The Court's historical and modem harm analyses involve the First
Amendment, equal protection, political participation and the Dormant
Commerce Clause. Before a comparative harm analysis is proposed, an
assessment of the Court's use of harm will be analyzed. The Court at-
tempts to employ objective tests and rationales that fail to consistently
acknowledge and balance competing claims. In attempting to achieve
neutrality, the Court requires a causative demonstration of harm in many
cases. The Court's attempt at objectivity and neutrality falls, and the ten-
sion between competing claims remains. Only when the Court employs
reason and discourse does it succeed in balancing interests.
A. Harm and the First Amendment: Illegal Advocacy, Fighting Words,
the Diluted Message and Societal Effects
1. Illegal Advocacy and Fighting Words
63In Dennis v. United States, the Court conclusively reasoned that
Dennis's actions caused the risk of overthrowing the government. 64 Den-
nis organized a Communist organization during the McCarthy Era.65 The
government dismantled Dennis's organization for violating the Smith
Act.66 Dennis's First Amendment claim failed because the Court ruled
that the government possessed sufficient justification in prohibiting
speech that elicited violence, terrorism, and a "clear and present dan-
60. See Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxy-
moron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25, 49 (1989) (referring to H.L.A. Hart that the obvious purpose
of law is survival).
61. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 115-20 (referring to the problems associated with apportion-
ment and suffrage, and the debate about reallocating political power before and during the drafting
of the U.S. Constitution).
62. Id.
63. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
64. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494.
65. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 983 (Aspen Publishers 2001) [hereinafter
CHEMERINSKY]; Dennis, 341 U.S. at 505. The timing of this case can not be ignored since commu-
nism was a perceived threat to the U.S. government in the 1950s.
66. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 505. Perhaps the most troubling part is that the government chose to
restrict speech in the most important context, political participation. See supra note 19.
2004]
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ger., 6 7 The extent of the Court's analysis involved the determination of
whether the government's "fear of being overthrown [was] reason-
able?". 68 The Court answered affirmatively because the fear of commu-
nism threatened U.S. security, and the Court deferred to Congress.
69 Jus-
tice Vinson for the majority exclaimed that "no proof is necessary to
overthrow the government., 70 The 1951 clear and present danger test was
criticized and replaced by the illegal advocacy and fighting words doc-
71trine.
In Beauharnais v. Illinois,72 the Court decided its first modern hate
speech case involving illegal advocacy.7
3 The Court found the Chicago
statute prohibiting conduct that "is productive of breach of the peace or
riots" constitutional. 74 "'The danger in these times from the coercive
activities of those who in the delusion of racial or religious conceit would
incite violence and breaches of the peace in order to deprive others of
their equal right to the exercise of their liberties, is emphasized [sic] by
events familiar to all."' 7 5 The Court's well-documented advancement that
racial tension and violence were a significant problem affirmed the right
of the legislature to pass a law trying to curtail such acts.
76
As a result, the Court found Beauharnais's derogatory and aggres-
sive expressions targeted at African Americans unprotected speech.
77
The Court favored equality over liberty and held that hate speech is not
afforded constitutional protection because it perpetuates inequality. The
Court reasoned that it is "precluded from saying that speech concededly
punishable when immediately directed at individuals cannot be outlawed
if directed at groups with whose position and esteem in society the affili-
ated individual may be inextricably involved.
78
67. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 508.
68. id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 505. Justice Vinson "rejects the contention that success or probability of success is
the criterion" for determining the likelihood of overthrowing the government, hence, a reasonable
fear is all that is necessary to trump First Amendment protection. Id
71. Id. at 525-26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (criticizing the clear and present danger test);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at 983.
72. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
73. See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 250.
74. Id. at 251 (citing 1Il. Rev. Stat. 1949, c. 38, Div. 1, § 471).
75. Id. at 261 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)).
76. See id. at 267 (disagreeing with the rationale of the state legislature, but the Court upheld
the statute because it could not find anything unconstitutional about it. The dissent described the
conduct of Beauharnais as constitutional because he was petitioning the legislature for policy reform
regarding the segregation of blacks and whites, and noted that this type of political representation is
precisely what the Constitution is set to uphold. 1d (Black, J., and Douglas, J., dissenting). See
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 580 (applying the same rationale which found that the conduct of the defendant
is expressly what the Constitution is set to uphold).
77. Id.




Almost two decades later, the Court favored liberty and overlooked
an equal protection claim. In Brandenburg v. Ohio,79 the State of Ohio
passed a law prohibiting advocacy of lawless activity, arguing that such
advocacy harmed societal welfare and security. The leader of a Ku
Klux Klan rally was convicted under the Ohio statute for encouraging
criminal activities.81 The Klan leader advocated for "bury[ing] the nig-
ger; that is what we are going to do to the niggers; freedom for whites."
82
He claimed that the Ohio law infringed on his First Amendment right to
advocate such statements. 83  The Court found the Ohio statute
unconstitutional.
The Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act cannot be sustained. The Act
punishes persons who advocate or teach the duty, necessity, or pro-
priety of violence as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
reform; or who publish or circulate or display any book or paper con-
taining such advocacy; or who justify the commission of violent acts
with intent to exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doc-
trines of criminal syndicalism; or who voluntarily assemble with a
group formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndical-
ism.
84
Implicit in the Court's rationale is that Ohio intended to impermis-
sibly punish political advocates by opining that the act unduly punishes
those "advocat[ing] or teach [ing] ... as a means of accomplishingdvo"
political reform" 8 To conclude that the Klan leader was a political advo-
cate who intended to generate reform, is to ignore that the leader used
threats and the promotion of violence to accomplish the goal of inequal-
ity. The Court missed the competing harm claim, and as a result, its "bal-
ancing" test did not weigh nor did it in fact balance constitutional inter-
ests.
The Court established a three-part test to determine when the gov-
86ernment can restrict free speech . The Court evaluated: 1) imminentharm; 2) likelihood of producing illegal activity; and 3) intent to cause
79. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The progress of the civil rights movement at
this point in history advanced considerably compared to the lack of progress in the early 1950s when
Beauharnais was decided. It is interesting that the Court sought to limit equality just as the civil
rights movement was gaining momentum. This suggests that dominant society was seeking to main-
tain security and survival.
80. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445.
81. Id. at 444-45.
82. Id. at 446 n. I (noting that some of the comments were inaudible although it was clear that
the Klan leader was making violent threats against African-Americans).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 448.
85. See id. at 448-49.
86. See generally id. at 447 (discussing three factors which must be considered when making
determinations of whether speech incites imminent lawless action); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at
989-90.
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imminent illegality.87 The Court found that the Ohio statute was over-
broad and did "not distinguish [sic] from incitement to imminent lawless
action." 88 In short, the Court did not believe that the Klan leader's re-
marks would incite criminal actions and there was no evidence of his
intent to do so.
89
Virginia v. Black9° illustrates the Court's recent application of the
fighting words doctrine. 9' This case involved two separate cross-burning
incidences.92 The first petitioner burned a cross at a Ku Klux Klan rally.
93
The second case involved two petitioners who burned a cross at the home
of an African-American family.94 The Virginia legislature passed a law
seeking to prohibit cross-burning both in a private and public setting.
95
The Virginia statute deemed the act of cross-burning prima facie evi-
dence that parties intended to intimidate.96 As a result, the Virginia Su-
preme Court found the statute unconstitutional.97
Justice O'Connor, speaking for a plurality, examined the history of
cross-burning extensively concluding that it has been used as symbolic
speech and for the purposes of racial intimidation. 98 Because cross-
burning had been used for symbolic speech, O'Connor found the Vir-
ginia statute unconstitutional on its face: 99
Virginia's statute does not run afoul of the First Amendment insofar
as it bans cross burning with intent to intimidate. Unlike the statute at
issue in R.A. V., the Virginia statute does not single out for oppro-
brium only that speech directed toward 'one of the specified disfa-
vored topics.'1°°
Justice O'Connor would have found the statute constitutionally
permissible had the Virginia legislature sought to ban cross-burning that
was used to intimidate without concluding that all cross-burning causes
intimidation. 10' Black's case was vacated, and Elliott's and O'Mara's
87. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
88. Id. at 448.
89. Id. at 451.
90. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
91. See generally Black, 538 U.S. at 343 (discussing the recent application of the fighting
words doctrine).
92. Id. at 348-50.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 348.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 350-51.
98. See id. at 353-58.
99. See id. at 363 (disagreeing with the Virginia Supreme Court, which held that content-
based prohibition is always unconstitutional on its face).
100. Id. at 362 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 307, 391 (1992)).
101. Id. at 361 (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391, "[w]e did not hold in RAY. that the First
Amendment prohibits all forms of content-based discrimination within a proscribable area of speech.
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case was remanded to determine whether their cross-burning was used to
intimidate. 1
02
The Court acknowledged that content-based prohibition is permissi-
ble when the message or conduct seeks to elicit anger, resent or alarm.'
03
This prohibition sets forth the goal of "keeping the peace," not for pur-
poses of perpetuating equality.104 Here again, possible riots or violence is
the harm, and not the equality of blacks or other targeted groups.0 5 Al-
though the Court did not explicitly indicate that parties must prove the
alleged harm, the Court implied it by stating that it is necessary to dem-
onstrate that respondents intended to intimidate.
106
The Court was unwilling to trump a constitutional right when the
respondent did not directly intend harmful consequences and declined to
hold that all those who burned crosses intended to cause intimidation and
perpetuated the inequality of African-Americans and other targeted
groups. 07 Black argued that his cross-burning was not intended to cause
intimidation. 10 8 In relying upon the historical, celebratory use of cross
burning, the Court rationalized that since cross-burning was not always
used to intimidate, it is unconstitutional for a state to prohibit all cross-
burning.'09 Because the statute did not account for celebratory purposes,
the Court held that a prima facie evidence provision, therefore, violated
the Constitution."10
Black's cross-burning was intended to send a message of racial ine-
quality and intimidation."' Black targeted African-Americans, Mexi-
cans, and those who support their equality. 112 Yet, the Court found that
Black's conduct did not create a "true threat" because Black did not pos-
sess the requisite intent to directly intimidate."13 The Court argued that
Black's burning took place on a private road thereby minimizing the
intimidation that could arise. 114 Not only did a police officer stop to
Rather, we specifically stated that some types of content discrimination did not violate the First
Amendment").
102. See id. at 389 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dismissing the idea that cross-burning could ever
be used in a modern day application as expressive speech due to its absolute link to racial intimida-
tion).
103. Id. at 360.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 361.
107. Id. at 364.
108. Id. at 356.
109. See id.
110. See generally id. at 390 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that cross-burning is rarely, if
ever, used as a non-racial celebratory expression in the present day).
111. Id. at 349-51. Black concedes that his conduct targeted those racially diverse and those
who supported their equality, and his derogatory and inciting comments were meant to mobilize his
base to take action in support of racial denigration.
112. See id. at 349.
113. Id. at 356.
114. Id. at 351.
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watch the burning but so did those passing by. 115 The road was not very
private after all. Black may not have known that his cross-burning would
directly intimidate or harm specific individuals since only whites were
presumably present at the rally. However, his actions perpetuated intimi-
dation and inequality. The Court's distinction would have been less
flawed had Black's conduct been irrelevant to the intimidation often as-
sociated with cross burning and celebratory for reasons other than racial
denigration.
In the second scenario, the Court remanded O'Mara and Elliott's
case because it found that their cross-burning specifically targeted Afri-
can-Americans at their home. 16 Elliott and O'Mara burned a cross in the
yard of an African-American man "'to get back' at" him. ' 7 The Court
found that respondents possessed the required intent to cause harm."
18
Yet, in both scenarios, cross burning was used to denounce racial equal-
ity and proclaim white supremacy either through physical threats or pro-
motion of Klan ideals and actions." 9 For this reason, the Court's ration-
ale is flawed.
2. Diluted Message
Roberts v. United States Jaycees 20 illustrates a second type of First
Amendment harm: the diluted message.' 2' The Jaycees prohibited
women from joining the organization claiming that the presence of
women diluted the organization's message promoting young men. 122 The
Court found that claimant's equal protection claim trumped the Jaycees'
First Amendment claim.123 The Court reasoned that the presence of
women would not dilute the Jaycees' message promoting men. 24 The
Court balanced the restrictions on the First Amendment with the Equal
Protection Clause.
25
The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, abso-
lute. Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations
adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppres-
115. Id. at 348 (noting that passing drivers observed the cross burning and stopped to inquire).
116. See id. at 350-51.
117. Id. at 350 (quoting the trial court).
118. Id. at 351.
119. See generally id. at 367-68 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing that the intent to intimi-
date is in the history of cross-burning).
120. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
121. See generally Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609 (discussing the First Amendment harm of the
"diluted message").
122. Id. at 613-16 (also discussing the private versus public accommodations debate finding
the Jaycees fell under both since it used public venues, and therefore, found the Minnesota's public
accommodation statute applicable).
123. See id. at 630.
124. Id. at 630.
125. Id. at 622.
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sion of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly
less restrictive of associational freedoms.'
26
The Court concluded that the Jaycees message has not been and will
not be unduly burdened by the presence of women. 27 The Court held
that the state's compelling interest to prevent gender discrimination is a
warrantable restriction on free speech, particularly when it is done in the
least restrictive manner possible.128 The Court reasoned that the Jaycees's
alleged First Amendment violation was invalid or unsubstantiated:
It is similarly arguable that, insofar as the Jaycees is organized to
promote the views of young men whatever those views happen to be,
admission of women as voting members will change the message
communicated by the group's speech because of the gender-based as-
sumptions of the audience. Neither supposition, however, is sup-
ported by the record. In claiming that women might have a different
attitude about such issues as the federal budget, school prayer, voting
rights, and foreign relations, or that the organization's public posi-
tions would have a different effect if the group were not "a purely
young men's association," the Jaycees relies solely on unsupported
generalizations about the relative interests and perspectives of men
and women. Although such generalizations may or may not have a
statistical basis in fact with respect to particular positions adopted by
the Jaycees, we have repeatedly condemned legal decisionmaking
that relies uncritically on such assumptions.1
29
The Court held that excluding women perpetuated the subordination
and oppression of women in society.' 30 Creating equality under the law
"reflects a recognition of the changing nature of the American economy
and of the importance, both to the individual and to society, of removing
the barriers to economic advancement and political and social integration
that have historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups, including
women."131
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 32 the Court faced a very similar
situation as in the Jaycees case. The Boy Scouts of America (BSA) al-
leged that Dale, a scout leader who was gay, diluted the organization's
message promoting traditional family values. 133 They argued that the
mere presence of Dale diluted the BSA's message. 134 The BSA claimed
that to continue its message promoting traditional families, the organiza-
126. Id. at 623.
127. See id. at 627-28.
128. See id. at 630-31.
129. Id. at 627-28 (citations omitted).
130. See id. at 628.
131. Id. at 626.
132. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
133. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 656.
134. Id. at 653.
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tion had to exclude Dale from its association.' 35 Dale argued the State of
New Jersey possessed a compelling state interest in prohibiting the dis-
crimination in public accommodations.' 36 The high court of New Jersey
found that the Boy Scouts were, in effect, a public organization that en-
joyed great access to public places and resources.1 37 Implicit in this ar-
gument is the right to equal protection as an active member of the gay
community. 3s The tension between the two claims is obvious. The BSA
wanted to exercise free association with non-gays, and the state and Dale
sought a non-discrimination policy. The Court found the BSA's argu-
ment persuasive and agreed Dale's presence would dilute the organiza-
tion's message.
39
However, the Court failed to adequately balance Dale's competing
claim as it did in Roberts v. Jaycees.'4 The Court also failed to draw a
reasonable distinction between the Jaycees and Boy Scouts cases. In-
stead, it concluded that gays would dilute BSA's message promoting
heterosexuality, even though the BSA had a policy not to discuss sexual-
ity at all. 14 1 Instead, the Court held that although "homosexuality has
gained greater societal acceptance . . . this is scarcely an argument for
denying First Amendment protection to those who refuse to accept these
VeS,,142views.
' ' 4
3. Harmful Societal Effects: Obscenity, Pornography and the First
Amendment
a. Obscenity
In Stanley v. Georgia, the Court held that Georgia's obscenity defi-
nition impeded individual thought because the law extended to activities
occurring in one's own home.' 43 The Court found that viewing obscene
material privately was a victimless act, and not even society or morality
was harmed. 144
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he
135. See id. at 652.
136. See id. at 645.
137. Id. at 646.
138. See id. at 645. The Court did not address Dale's claim, nor did it address New Jersey's
compelling state interest in promoting equality under its public accommodations law. Id.
139. Id. at 656.
140. See id. at 660.
141. Id. at 654-55.
142. Id. at 660 (citation omitted). The Court held that "public orjudicial disapproval of a tenet
of an organization's expression does not justify the State's effort to compel the organization to
accept members where such acceptance would derogate from the organization's expressive mes-
sage." Id. at 661.
143. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
144. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566-67.
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may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heri-
tage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
men's minds.
145
The Court also rejected the state's argument that obscene material
causes anti-social behavior 46 because it found a lack of evidence proving
that private viewing harmed society. 147 A formidable competing claim
was not made other than to say the government has an interest in
preventing anti-social behavior. The anti-social behavior may include
rape and violence to women, and if so, the equal protection doctrine
could have been summoned.
Four years later when the Court was faced with the commercial dis-
tribution of obscene materials it found that harm to morality, and thus
harm to society, was evident. In Miller v. California,148 the Court would
not extend constitutional protection to sexually explicit material lacking
in social value. 149 The appellant mailed sexually explicit materials to
unsolicited or unsuspecting individuals in violation of a California stat-
ute. 5° The Court found that the state was within its constitutional pa-
rameters when it sought to prohibit unsolicited, obscene material.' 5' The
Court recognized that the state sought to protect society at large, and
particularly, the recipients of obscene material. 152 The Court also recog-
nized the importance of protecting material that contains "serious" liter-
ary, artistic, scientific and educational value so not to silence valuable
speech. 153 Again, an adequate competing claim was not made although
arguably one could have been made. The harm to society claim would
have been more adequate had it been rooted in constitutional law. For
example, if the obscene material harmed a particular group in a way that
prevented access to rights or privileges, then an adequate constitutional
claim would have been made. 154
In an attempt to balance competing interests, 55 the Court estab-
lished an obscenity rule protecting unsuspecting adults from receiving
pornographic material, otherwise understood as time, place and manner
145. Id. at 565.
146. Id. at 566-67.
147. See id. at 566.
148. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
149. Miller, 413 U.S. at 36-37.
150. Id. at 17-18.
151. See id. at 30-31.
152. See id. at 24 (seeking to restrict distribution of material that is 'patently offensive' in order
to protect society).
153. ld. at 24.
154. Further, the Court's rationale is contradictory because it concludes that offending commu-
nity standards warrants a constitutional trump. This contradicts Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
571 (2003), where the Court held that imposing the majority's views on the minority is impermissi-
ble. See supra note 11. The Court's holdings would possess greater effectiveness if constitutional
values complemented instead of contradicted each other.
155. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 19-20. Here, the Court stated that the competing interests were the
state's right to protect public morals and the pornographers' right to produce obscene material.
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restrictions on First Amendment speech. 156 Obscenity has been defined
as:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a pat-
ently offensive way, sexual conduct .. .; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value. 1
57
Finding that harm existed when society's sexual mores were of-
fended, the Court placed another restriction the First Amendment.1
58
b. Child Pornography
The New York v. Ferber Court found that photographs and films
depicting minors engaged in sexual activity harmed children. 159 The
Court reasoned that the "distribution network for child pornography must
be closed if the production of material which requires the sexual exploi-
tation of children is to be effectively controlled." 160 The Court made this
determination because congressional data indicated that child pornogra-
phy harms children's psychology and physical well-being, and because
pedophiles use pornographic images to entice children to have sex with
them. 161 Relying on the data, the Court concluded that the government
possessed a compelling interest to ban child pornography. The Court
again held that sexually explicit images should be taken as a whole in
order to avoid criminalizing images with social, educational, artistic or
political value.
162
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court found congressional
evidence insufficient to prove that virtual child pornography harms ac-
tual children. 163 Without actual harm, the Court could not justify the
overreach of the Child Pornography Protection Act ("CPPA") which
156. See id. at 24. However, the appellant's First Amendment claim received little attention
because the Court was focused on qualifying the ambiguous Roth obscenity test in order to help
resolve the many obscenity cases that sat before federal and state courts. See id at 29.
157. Id. at 24 (citation omitted). It is important to note that the average person may not apply
community standards from a gender neutral viewpoint. In other words, such definitions may not take
into account the oppression of females in pornography if evaluated by male standards of sexuality.
See Catherine A. Mackinnon, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM AND PORNOGRAPHY 169-175 (Dru-
cilia Cornell ed., 2000) [hereinafter Not a Moral Issue]. Further, even if community standards reflect
the objectification and consequently the harm of women, the Court may find the material protected
speech because it contains some value, probably a male value. See id. at 176.
158. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
159. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758.
160. Id. at 759.
161. See id. at 758 n.9 (referring to congressional findings).
162. See id. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring).
163. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002).
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banned virtual child pomography.' 64 As a result, the Court found that the
CPPA "chill[ed]"'165 protected speech because Congress had overstepped
constitutional boundaries by prohibiting speech, not otherwise consid-
ered criminal, in an attempt to stop the crimes of pedophiles.166 "The
mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient
reason for banning it."'' 67 The Court referred extensively to Ferber.
168
Concluding that Ferber permitted restrictions on free speech when actual
children were harmed, the Ashcroft Court held that Ferber only intended
to reach pornography made with real children. 169 Thus, virtual porn did
not directly harm minors, according to the Court.
170
Congress compiled a report outlining findings that virtual porn
harmed children. 171 Congressional findings indicated that perpetrators
use virtual child porn as an instrument to encourage children to engage in
sexual conduct. 172 The congressional report also indicated that virtual
children are indistinguishable from actual children. 173 Indistinguishable
photos pose a serious problem when trying to prosecute pornographers
using real children.'74 Finally, Congress sought to deter the making of
virtual pornography to curb the child porn industry.1
75
The government argued that the use of virtual photos perpetuates
the abuse of children and the desires of child molesters, which justifies a
compelling government interest to stop virtual child pornography. 76 The
government also argued that the Court should not protect sexually ex-
plicit material whose only focus portrays hard pornographic images of
children. 177 Specifically, the government claimed that it sought to elimi-
nate material promoting or advertising images depicting individuals that
"appear to be a minor."'' 78 The government explained that Congress in-
tended to protect children.' 79 In order to protect children, the government
needed to criminalize virtual child pornography that is indistinguishable
164. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 251.
165. See id. at 244.
166. Id. at 253.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 239-56.
169. See id.; see also JAMES A. HENDERSON JR., ET. AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 110 (Aspen
Press 5th ed., 1999) [hereinafter HENDERSON] (explaining that direct causation is found where
evidence demonstrates a direct link between respondent's actions and the alleged injury).
170. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 241.
171. Id. at 270.
172. Id. at 263 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173. Id. at 264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 254-55.
176. Id. at 252.
177. Id. at 250.
178. id. at 254.
179. Id.
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from actual child pornography claiming that it endangers the physical
and psychological well being of children.'
80
Congressional findings and deterrence theory did not convince the
Court that a sufficient harm existed. 18 1 Yet, similar findings in Ferber did
convince the Court of a sufficient harm.182 The Court rejected the statute
when the connection between virtual porn and the harm to actual chil-
dren became attenuated. 83 The Court did not find a causal relationship
between virtual child pornography and harm to actual children.
The Court refused to protect pornography made with actual children
because it found the material directly harmful to children's psychological
and physical well-being."& The fact that child porn was also used by
sexual perpetrators to entice and abuse their victims was an additional
reason to restrict speech; 185 yet, this alone would not warrant a constitu-
tional trump because virtual child porn did not directly harm children.186
The Court is inconsistent when balancing harm and the First Amend-
ment.
In summation, there exists a lack of discourse in the Court's ration-
ale because, in part, it required a direct, causal showing of harm reflect-
ing the Court's fluid, changing understanding of direct injury. For exam-
ple, in the child pornography cases, the Court required a demonstration
that specific children were harmed by the making and distribution of
pornographic images. Yet, Miller did not require a demonstration of
harm other than to say that when a community is offended then society is
harmed, which is circular and conclusive in reason. Miller also does not
help to address an equal protection harm resulting from the production
and distribution of pornography.' 87 In addition, whereas the Court fa-
vored gender equality over First Amendment rights, queer equality took
a back-seat to the First Amendment. Arguably, the Court employs a harm
analysis in order to apply an objective standard although this standard
achieves anything but neutrality. Perhaps neutral on its face, in effect the
Court's holdings allow for the perpetuation of inequality and denial of
liberty in most cases. t88
180. Id.
181. Id. at 249-50.
182. Id. The Court also considered whether those accused under the CPPA would otherwise be
convicted of criminal activity. See id. at 254. Because the Court answered this question negatively, it
found the CPPA overreaching. See id. at 258.
183. Id. at 261.
184. See supra notes 158-162.
185. Id.
186. See Ashcroft, 525 U.S. at 250.
187. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
32-45 (1987).
188. See Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157




B. Harmful Societal Effects: Political Participation and Morality
Whereas Georgia, in Bowers v. Hardwick,189 sought to explicitly
maintain the criminality of homosexuality,' 90 other states like Colorado
sought a more systematic approach in keeping queers suppressed in soci-
ety. In Romer v. Evans,19 1 Colorado amended its constitution, forbidding
queers from gaining political and legal protection. 192 The Court recog-
nized the societal effects of Amendment 2, noting that the amendment
would severely curtail queers from advancing in a democratic forum and
from seeking any legal relief.1 93 The Court implicitly recognized the in-
terrelationship of law and society. 194 The Court also rejected the state's
claim that the amendment did nothing more than restrict "special
rights."'195 The Court found that extending political protection to queers
would not harm others, and concluded that the only victims of Amend-
ment Two were the lesbians and gays of Colorado.
196
In Lawrence v. Texas,197 the Court overturned Bowers and held that
the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause protect queers
from government intrusion.198 The Court employed both clauses to ex-
plain that the State of Texas cannot discriminate against queers in order
to suppress them in society.199 The Court did not explicitly find same sex
sodomy constitutional; instead, it opined further and stressed that queers
are entitled to the same liberties as heterosexuals. 200 The Court again
recognized the detrimental effects of sodomy statutes on queer equality
and acceptance in society as it did in Romer.2 0 1 It also found that Texas's
rationale to protect society was illegitimate and implausible.2 2 As a re-
sult, the Court again held that the only victims were queers. 203
The Court concluded queers cannot be denied individual rights be-
cause Texas and Colorado failed to demonstrate that queers caused socie-
189. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
190. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-92 (asserting that queers are not afforded constitutional
protection because gays harm society and morality).
191. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
192. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
193. See id. (holding that Amendment 2 imposes special disability upon queers).
194. See id. (finding that the protections withheld by Amendment 2 are taken for granted by
most people because they are the protections that constitute ordinary civic fife in free society).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 626-28 (holding that Amendment 2 withholds from homosexuals, but no others,
specific legal protections caused by discrimination).
197. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
198. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (holding that Justice Steven's dissent in Bowers v.
Hardwick should have been controlling).
199. Id. at 563-64.
200. See id. at 567 (acknowledging that the Constitution grants queers the right to engage in
intimate conduct in the same manner it allows heterosexual couples to do so).
201. See id. at 581-82 (holding that sodomy laws brand queers as criminals, creating automatic
stigmatization).
202. Id. at 578.
203. Id.
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204tal harm. In Lawrence and Romer, the Court valued equality over corn-ity of states.2 °5
C. Harmful Effects on Commerce: Dormant Commerce Clause
The Dormant Commerce Clause ("DCC") gives the Court power to
limit state regulation that would otherwise burden interstate com-
merce.20 6 In determining whether state laws impede interstate commerce,
the Court evaluates whether a state may discriminate against out-of-
staters by balancing the benefits of the law against the burdens imposed
on out-of-staters 0 7 In other words, the Court first identified the harms;
then, finding that a reasonable harm existed, the Court determined
whether the discriminatory law would remedy the injury.
Professor Chemerinsky best articulates the harm found in DCC
cases. In justifying the need for the DCC, Chemerinsky argues that "pro-
tectionist legislation" obstructs the free flow of commerce across state
borders and impedes the economic sufficiency of states, which ultimately
affects the sufficiency of individuals. 20 8 Those trying to compete in the
interstate market are harmed by states that attempt to obstruct the free
flow of commerce. Generally speaking, in all DCC cases, the obstruction
of interstate commerce is the harm.
To illustrate, in Philadelphia v. New Jersey,2°9 New Jersey faced
excessive pollution and waste problems. 210 Disposing of excessive refuse
resulted in increased environmental and health hazards.2 1 In an attempt
to remedy these problems, the state prohibited non-New Jersey compa-
nies from using its landfills.1 2 New Jersey argued that the discriminatory
law would improve the state's environmental and health concerns.2 13 The
state of Pennsylvania argued that the discriminatory law burdened inter-
state commerce because Pennsylvanians would no longer be able to dis-
pose of their trash in New Jersey. The Court evaluated and balanced New
Jersey's harm against the harm imposed on other states.
214
204. See id. (holding that the Texas statute furthered no legitimate state interest). See also
Romer, 517 U.S. at 626 (holding that Amendment 2 withdraws from homosexuals, but no others,
specific legal protection discrimination).
205. But see MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 91 (2003). Tushnet argues
that these cases reflect a cultural change on the Court more so than a finding that queer equality
trumped state interests. Id.
206. CHEMERNSKY, supra note 65, at 317.
207. Id. at 318.
208. Id. at 321 (referring to the positions of Professor Regan and Justice Jackson).
209. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
210. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 625.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 626.
214. Id. at 625-26. Assuming, as in Philadelphia, that the Court found both alleged harms
present, the Court then weighed the derived benefits. Id. at 626-27. By doing so, the Court consid-
ered the relevancy of the discriminatory law to the problem presented. Id at 628-29. In Philadel-
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The following cases are examples of the Court's requirement that
parties prove direct harm. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Commission,215 Washington Apples was stripped of its ability to compete
in the North Carolina apple market.216 The Court held that North Caro-
lina failed to demonstrate how the discriminatory law ameliorated the
state's apple market.2t7 The discriminatory law may have been permissi-
ble, according to the Court, had it provided a meaningful benefit to North
Carolinians. 218 Where meaningful benefits are derived, the Court will
sometimes permit discrimination if it does not unduly burden interstate
commerce. 219  North Carolina restricted Washington Apples from
competing in its apple market in an effort to benefit in-state companies,
220not to remedy a compelling state problem. Washington Apples was
directly affected by the discriminatory law, and as a result, it was no
longer able to compete in the North Carolina apple market.22'
In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware,2 2 the
Court concluded that the State's scientific data was unsubstantiated and
insufficient to outweigh the burdens on interstate commerce, and found
the Iowa law unconstitutional.223 In fact, the Court found that the state
11 224"remedy" could create added expenses and danger to in-staters. The
Court held that a direct, causative link was necessary to conclude that
benefits outweighed and remedied the injury.225 The Court found that the
state had failed to prove that the discriminatory law would benefit in-
staters .226
phia, the Court did not find that the state's environmental and health problems would improve as a
result of the prohibition of non-resident dumping. Id. at 629.
215. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
216. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 340 (explaining that the North Carolina apple market was suffering as a
result of Washington Apples' success).
217. The North Carolina law discriminated in both its purpose and effect against Washington
Apples. Id. In determining whether the law is discriminatory, the Court finds whether the law is
facially neutral or facially discriminatory. Id. at 350-52. The Court found laws facially discrimina-
tory when the law overtly retaliates against other states, or when the discriminating state seeks to
protect itself. Id. Facially discriminating laws are unconstitutional. Id. at 352-53. The Court de-
termined a law unconstitutional when the purpose and/or effects of the law discriminate. See, e.g.,
C & A Carbon, Inc. v. Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1994).
218. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 349-51 (citing Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S.
761, 766 (1945)).
219. Id. at 350.
220. Id. at 352-53.
221. Id. at 351-52.
222. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
223. Id. at 671 (finding that "the State failed to present any persuasive evidence" that sixty-five
foot double-length trucks are less safe than fifty-five foot single-length trucks).
224. Id. at 674-75.
225. See id. at 670-71 (citing Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441
(1978)); see e.g. HENDERSON, supra note 169, at 110.
226. Id. at 671. In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., the Court also did not find a link between
the alleged harm and the state benefits derived from the discriminatory law. Exxon Corp. v. Gover-
nor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978). The Court upheld the Maryland law since the law did not
discriminatorily benefit in-state companies. Id. at 127-28. The law also did not impede interstate
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The Dormant Commerce Clause supports the argument for a com-
parative harm analysis in two ways. First, the Court explicitly identifies
competing harms. 227 Second, the DCC provides support for judicial
activism because Congress cannot effectively ensure constitutional
protections at all local and state levels. 228 Opponents of the DCC rarely,
if ever, question the regulation of commerce at the federal level because
the Constitution explicitly authorizes Congress to regulate commerce via
the Commerce Clause.229 Thus, where Congress can act, the judiciary can
review those actions.230 The DCC allows the judiciary to serve as an ap-
propriate check on state actions impeding interstate commerce.2 31 The
Court is more consistent in this application than in other harm contexts
because interstate commerce is a clearly defined area of constitutional
law where the harm is easily identifiable, generally speaking.
There is also the implication that the Court requires a causal
harm.232 It is tempting to argue that a showing of a causal harm should be
necessary to trump constitutional principles. Harm found in commerce is
probably the best example of where requiring a causal showing works in
a constitutional context. Yet, it is unlikely that sociological data proving
a causal connection in other harm contexts will consistently get the Court
out of a constitutional conundrum. 23 3 Because causation cannot truly be
demonstrated in most contexts, this article argues for discourse that en-
courages dialogue from the perspective of the "victim" and transcends
personal biases in uncovering discrimination.
D. Conclusions Based on the Court's Harm Analyses
First, what is meant by "harm" is not adequately explained by the
Court's use of the word. The Court has used harm in various contexts
without identifying the injury or its consequence, thus, failing to apply
consistent reason. The exception to this is found in the Dormant Com-
merce Clause cases where the Court identified the competing harms and
commerce. Id. at 127. The Court did not find the law discriminatory nor did it hold that interstate
commerce suffered. Thus, no harm existed and Exxon's claim failed. Id. at 128-29.
227. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 673-75. The Court used strict scrutiny when examining the discrimi-
natory effects on the law because the freedom to participate in interstate commerce is a fundamental
right.
228. See id. at 675-76.
229. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
230. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (holding that "[i]t is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is").
231. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at 317.
232. The Court also finds an inverse causal relationship by determining whether the means fit
the ends. In other words, the Court determines whether the "remedy"--often a discriminatory action
or legislation-will actually resolve the harm. A direct link between the harm and the remedy there-
fore exists.
233. See Deborah Cameron & Elizabeth Frazer, On the Question of Pornography and Sexual
Violence: Moving Beyond Cause and Effect, in Feminism and Pornography 240-53, 241 (Drucilla
Cornell ed., 2000) (asserting that true causation is not possible because intervening variables affect a
causal relationship and encouraging development of the discussion beyond cause and effect).
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balanced them in a reasoned manner-most of the time. Second, the
Court attempted to resolve tensions by implementing "objective" tests in
order to achieve neutrality in some scenarios, yet it fell short of resolving
the actual tension. These objective tests also fail to identify a competing
claim. The Miller test, for example, does not account for harm to equal-
ity-a potential competing claim where degrading pornographic images
portray women as submissive creatures who want to be dominated and
raped. Third, the Court's harm analyses usually rely on causative injury,
an unrealistic venture. 234 Requiring a showing of causation does not re-
solve the uncertainty of knowing whether the harm arose out of the said
conduct or law.235 It may decrease a subjective uncertainty, but it will not
significantly eliminate it due to intervening variables that are often im-
measurable. 236 Requiring causation is also self-defeating when seeking to
transcend the inherent inequalities in the legal system, and it just contin-
237ues to perpetuate law in a non-transformative way.
E. Canada's Use of Harm in Resolving Competing Claims
Professor Vivian Curran posits that a greater understanding of inter-
national legal systems lends greater insight into the legal system of one's
234. The federal standing requirement prescribes the notion that a causative injury must be
established in order to bring and win a lawsuit. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 1; FED. R. CIv. P. 17.
As Prof. Chemerinsky explains, "The Supreme Court has declared that both causation and redress-
ability are constitutional requirements for standing." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIcTION
74 (4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter FEDERAL JURISDICTION].
235. See Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 20-21
(1992) [hereinafter Scales].
236. Several problems arise with a causal requirement. There is no definitive link which will
unquestionably account for the harm. For example, Professor Judith Butler posits that anti-
pornographers fail to draw a causal link between pornography and the subordination of women.
Judith Butler, The Force of Fantasy: Feminism, Mapplethorpe, and Discursive Excess, in Feminism
and Pornography 497 (Drucilla Cornell ed., 2000). Butler suggests, in a much more comprehensive
manner than I explain here, that there is no ontological proof that pornography causes harm to
women and people of color. See id. at 488. She posits that radical feminists such as Professor Cath-
erine MacKinnon, whom Butler describes as anti-pornographers, are actually disempowering women
instead of protecting them because the very act of trying to protect women actually disempowers
them. Id. at 496-97. Butler argues that women are victims as a result of the anti-pornography
movement. See id. 503-04. Finally, she suggests that the real harm is restricting speech protected by
the First Amendment. See id. at 504.
Others argue that submissive, degrading portrayals of women perpetuate the epidemic of
sexual assault including rape, sexual molestation, incest and domestic violence, and therefore, the
deprivation of equality. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 37 (1993); see Mar Matsuda,
Progressive Civil Liberties, 3 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REV. 9, 16-17 (1993) (articulating the
ways in which hate speech affects targeted groups); see Militarization, supra note 16, at 551-52.
Obviously, a legal struggle exists between the radical feminists and Butler. This struggle will not be
resolved by the Miller test. The Miller obscenity test guides the Court in determining when material
is considered obscene, yet it falls short when guiding the Court to determine the true question pre-
sented-the identification and resolution of the competing harms. For example, assume women
brought an equal protection claim against pornographers arguing that pornography caused inequality.
Pornographers could argue that the First Amendment protects their material because it contains
expressive, valuable content. Under the Miller obscenity definition, the pornographic material could
be considered protected speech because it contains expressive content.
237. See Militarization, supra note 16, at 551-52.
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native country.238 Curran discusses the importance of conducting com-
parative legal analysis with other systems, especially when their ap-
proach is different from the U.S. approach.239 In so doing, I will address
the Canadian approach to competing claims below.
The Canadian Charter grants the Supreme Court of Canada explicit
authority to analyze competing claims. 240 The Supreme Court of Canada
understands that where constitutional claims conflict, harm is at the core
of the tension.241 Rather than employing levels or tiers of scrutiny to re-
solve the tension, the Supreme Court of Canada uses a balancing ap-
242proach. The two cases discussed below illustrate Canada's express
identification and balance of harm in competing claims.
The first case involved freedom of expression and racial equality. In
R. v. Keegstra, a teacher brought a freedom of expression claim because
he was convicted of violating a hate speech statute.243 The teacher made
anti-Semitic statements in his classroom and expected his students to
repeat these "facts" on examination answers. 244 Alberta prosecutors ar-
gued that hate speech causes violence and fosters inequality. 245 The Ca-
nadian Supreme Court held that hate speech is not protected speech,
246
and found that the statute banning hate speech is constitutional because,
in part, the Canadian Charter seeks to nurture equality and multicultural-
ism. The Canadian Court reasoned that equality is more valuable than
promoting derogatory ideas.
247
The second case involved tensions between gender equality and
freedom of expression. In R. v. Butler, the Supreme Court of Canada
reinterpreted the definition of obscenity to include harmful depictions of
women, finding that Section 163 of the Code is aimed at preventing harm
to society, "a moral objective that is valid under s. 1 of the Charter.
2 48
The prosecution a49 argued that the material depicted harmful and exploit-
ive images of women, and as a result, the defendant's freedom of speech
claim should fail. 25 0 The Supreme Court of Canada created workable
238. See VIvAN GROSSWALD CURRAN, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 7-8 (Carolina
Acad. Press 2002).
239. Id. at 10.
240. Frank lacobucci, The Supreme Court of Canada: Its History, Power and Responsibilities,
4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 27, 31 (2002).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 2.
244. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 2.
245. Id. at 3.
246. Id. at 2 (referring to Parliament's legislative findings defined in the Criminal Code and the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
247. Id. at 3-4.
248. R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 4.
249. In Canada, the selling and possession of obscene material falls under criminal conduct.
See Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, at 8.
250. Id.; see also Ann Scales, Avoiding Constitutional Depression: Bad Attitudes and the Fate
of Butler, in FEMINISM AND PORNOGRAPHY 322-23 (Drucilla Cornell ed., 2000).
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tests to determine whether the images advanced a risk of substantial
harm that society is unwilling to tolerate.
251
The Canadian Court did not assert that the harm must be measur-
able, or that the prosecution had to demonstrate the harm. Instead, the
Canadian Court stated that "[i]f the community cannot tolerate this risk
of harm, then ... these materials, even though they may offer a non-
violent, non-degrading, non-dehumanizing content, will constitute undue
exploitation of sex and fall under the definition of obscenity" (emphasis
added).252 Canada, in balancing competing rights, found that equality
253trumps free expression.
I do not suggest that the Canadian system is without flaws or with-
out impermissible infringements. The Canadian Court required first that
claimants demonstrate a causative harm.254 In Keegstra, the Canadian
Court concluded that "the harm caused by hate propaganda represents a
pressing and substantial concern in a free and democratic society. '25
5
Requiring a causal demonstration is problematic for the same reasons
briefly articulated above. A demonstration of causal harm creates a feint,
and consequently, perpetuates inequalities by allowing the Court to be-
lieve it is implementing an objective standard while failing to address the
actual harm that underlies the conflict.
The Court then concluded that a causal showing of injury is not
necessary. In Butler, the Court held that "a risk of harm" can trump free
speech,256 which could allow for a great many impermissible infringe-
ments. A risk of harm is unnecessary in most scenarios where there are
valid injuries. For example, in Dennis v. United States,25 the Court
trumped First Amendment rights because Dennis's speech advocating
communism created a risk of overthrowing the government. The Court
found that this potential risk was sufficient to outweigh liberty inter-
ests.258
IV. A COMPARATIVE HARM ANALYSIS
Professor Richard Pildes opines that the Court needs a new strand of
constitutional analysis to resolve competing claims. 259 The new strand,
Professor Pildes argues, should incorporate and truly balance societal
251. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, at 3, 16.
252. Id. at 37.
253. See id. at 9.
254. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 at 48.
255. Id. at 34.
256. Butler, [19921 1 S.C.R. 452, at 26.
257. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 505.
258. The Court will not find a potential injury sufficient when private parties argue for preven-
tative action to curtail harm. See, e.g., FEDERAL JURISDICTION, supra note 234, at 74 (discussing the
causation requirement upheld in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
259. Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and
Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 726 (1998).
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complexities. 26 The current conception of rights weighs individual rights
versus the good of the community where one interest trumps the other,
according to Pildes.26' He argues that the current conception is a misno-
mer because it really allows the Court to screen for impermissible gov-
ernmental regulation and infringements, and does not weigh competing
262interests. In some incidences, infringement will be necessary. Where
the infringement of individual or community rights is necessary, the in-
fringement must comply with the principles of the Constitution. 63
Professor Pildes's postulation supports the comparative harm analy-
sis for two reasons. One, Pildes acknowledges that the Court's balance
test is a "rote exercise" only.264 He explains that the Court really does not
265weigh competing interests. Instead, the Court considers the cause of
action within the relevant structural conception of the constitutional prin-
ciple at issue.266 The structural conception presumes that all individuals
and groups already enjoy constitutional protection. The Court fails to
identify competing interests, and reviewing claims based on a structural
conception, which ignores systematic inequalities.267 Two, Pildes posits
that individual rights exist and have meaning due to their social con-
text.268 The goal of a comparative harm analysis is to identify the harm,
and then as Pildes suggests, determine its constitutional value and its
effects in society.269 By identifying competing harms, the Court ac-
knowledges both claims, and must decide which constitutional principle
prevails.270
An elementary comparative law principle supports a competing
harm analysis. Comparative law professors recognize that the identifica-
tion of both similar and differentiating elements is essential in trying to
271understand various legal systems. When trying to compare, one must
identify what is at issue, and often, it is the differences or polarities that
cause legal tension.272 As Professor Curran explains: '"To deny difference
is to deny recognition to the particulars that constitute [identification]
260. Id.
261. Id. at 727-28 (referring to Ronald Dworkin in Taking Rights Seriously).
262. Id. at 731. The current conception refers to the two strands of constitutional analysis:
suspect class and fundamental right. Id. As an aside, screening for impermissible infringements is a
worthwhile and needed objective.
263. ld_
264. Id.
265. Id. I also note that the Court balanced competing interests in Jaycees v. Roberts and the
Dormant Commerce Clause cases. Supra notes 120-31, 206-233.




270. However, one constitutional right does not work independently of another. Rights are
interwoven, and without one, the others fail to exist. See TUSHNET, supra note 15.




itself; in that sense, it is to camouflage and erase identity.",21' Thus, to
compare is to identify, and to fail to identify erases that which is at issue.
This comparative law principle applies to competing constitutional
claims because, like the tension between countries, tensions exist be-
tween parties.274 In order to get at the root of the tension, one must iden-
tify the polarity, hence, identify the competing harm.
Like Professor Nice's co-constitutive approach, the comparative
harm analysis seeks to address the 'immediate, continuing, and real inju-
ries,' as they relate to competing claims. 275 The remainder of this section
seeks to explore the types of harms that are legally permissible using
queer equality, pornography and hate speech as illustrations.
A. Harm to Self
Two assertions usually exist when gay opponents claim that queers
are harmful to themselves. First, queers harm themselves because they
deny the primary purpose of their body: procreation.276 This assertion of
harm possesses little or no value because its rationale would then find
impotent men, sterile couples, and those choosing not to parent, unlawful
in their actions or inactions. Second, immoral conduct harms one's abil-
ity to live up to his or her potential and fulfill his or her dreams.27 7 Here
again, this assertion is valueless for many reasons including that this
claim is based entirely upon the belief system of a few dominant forces
in society. Even among the dominant members of society, one will find
subjective and varied understandings of what "ability" and "liv[ing] up to
[one's] potential" means.278 The Court cannot evaluate either assertion
without drawing upon personal experiences. Moreover, the Constitution
establishes the principle of individual autonomy and privacy, which pro-
hibits governmental interference with private conduct that does not in-
jury others.
B. Harm to Society and Morality
The harm to society notion posits that the actor benefits from his or
her actions while observers are harmed. In examining competing claims
involving queers and proponents of traditional families, Professor Tho-
mas Clark articulates three ways in which society and courts have used
273. Id. (acknowledging that most modern theorists recognize similarities between the systems;
however, Professor Curran calls for identification of the differences between various legal systems).
274. See id. (discussing the importance of identifying both the similarities and differences
between countries).
275. The Emerging Third Strand, supra note 20, at 1231 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996)).
276. Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 102 (1996) (referring
to arguments made by gay opponents).
277. Strong, supra note 36, at 1287.
278. Id.
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popular prejudice disguised as moral harm2 79 to withhold constitutional
rights for gays. 280 One, natural behavior dictates natural law, i.e. procrea-
tion. 8 Two, the preservation of heterosexual relationships is the primary
objective of society. 2  Three, queers are just outside the norm and unde-
serving of the benefits traditionally afforded to heterosexuals.283 These
reasons had been sufficient to deny queers constitutional protections such
as privacy, equality and due process.
The Court has favored subjective, moral harms over actual constitu-
tional harms when examining competing interests of unpopular groups,
with no critique of reason.285 Moral debates based in personal interpreta-
tions will detract from the actual harm. 286 Such personal interpretations
287are often based in ecclesiastical doctrine. Moreover, the Court has his-
torically failed to acknowledge the harmful consequences of anti-gay
policy in the workplace, the family, the military and school-key societal
institutions. Subjective moral harms are rarely, if ever, a plausible argu-
ment.
288
Finally, in making her argument that queers harm society, Professor
Anita Allen cautions the courts against reducing individual accountabil-
ity for the sake of privacy.289 She encourages accountability in order to
uphold traditional family values and societal mores. 290 A similar argu-
ment was made in Baker v. Vermont.291 Vermont argued that the state
entitled a few privileged individuals to marry because those individuals
279. Morality used here is a very different morality from that described by the moral-practical
discourse.
280. See Thomas Clark, Secularism and Sexuality, the Case for Gay Equality, THE HUMANIST,
May-June 1994, 23, 26. This article was published before the Court's Lawrence decision. Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
281. Clark, supra note 280 at 24-25.
282. Id. at 28.
283. Id. at 27.
284. Id. at 23.
285. Id. at 27. "Recent court decisions ... have recognized that indeed it is bias, not a rational
interest, that motivates unequal treatment of gays." Id. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 1039
(1986); see also Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 647 (2000).
286. Clark, supra note 280, at 26. Clark suggests that courts have been influenced by "the
traditional assumption that something is wrong or immoral about [homosexuality]. .. this assump-
tion has no foundation in any objective harm constituted by gay sex." Id.
287. Id. at 23. Clark explains: "[P]ublic policy codifying this [anti-gay] bias verges on a gov-
emnment establishment of religion." Id.
288. See generally id. In addition, Professor Nancy Knauer offers the "pro-family" explanation
as to how queers harm society. Nancy. J. Knauer, Science, Identity, and the Construction of the Gay
Political Narrative, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 78 (2003). According to the opposition, queers engage
in sexually deviant behavior, molest children, and cause the breakdown of the family and society.
See id. The victims of queer conduct include children, heterosexual marriages, and ultimately,
society. Knauer concludes that these arguments are unsubstantiated, particularly because they are
centered on subjective moral views. Id. at 85.
289. See generally Anita Allen, Privacy Isn't Everything: Accountability as a Personal and
Social Good, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1375 (2003).
290. Id.
291. See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that denying same sex marriage
rights is a violation of the Vermont Constitution).
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have the natural capacity to procreate. 92 The government has an interest
in extending the marital privilege to protect those most likely to beget
children.293 The government reasoned that marriage protects children,
and ultimately society, by making parents legally accountable as husband
and wife.294 Yet, this rationale fails to demonstrate how extending mar-. . • 295
riage to queers harms heterosexual couples and their children. The
harm to personal morality is also not sufficiently grounded in constitu-
tional doctrine, and therefore, it is not a sufficient reason to trump rights.
296
The Court supports this proposition as evidenced by Romer v. Evans
and Lawrence v. Texas.297 The Court rejected the use of subjective
298morality as evidence that queers harm society.
C. Harm to Others and the Practical Discourse Model
Harm to others is the only incidence where the Court should abridge
a constitutional right. The Court should consider trumping a constitu-
tional right when it causes injury that is detrimental to the integrity and
principles of the Constitution. Where no negative and harmful external-
ities exist, no victims or injury exist.299 Put simply, negative injury that
adversely affects individuals or groups and their access to constitutional
rights and privileges must exist. Without this, the alleged harm is insuffi-
cient to trump another's constitutional right.
Permitting constitutional trumps when claimants establish a "harm
to others" claim is a more reasoned approach. Harms should be measured
by the implementation of "ethical" and "moral-practical discourse.'
300
Some scholars debate whether practical discourse can be achieved.
30 1
Professor Jurgen Habermas posits that it can be done without employing
the erroneous and fated "theoretical objectification., 30 2 Before discussing
how moral-practical discourse can be done, it is important to be clear
about what moral-practical discourse is. Habermas explains: "The moral
point of view ... compels the participants to transcend the social and
historical context of their particular form of life and particular commu-




296. Romer, 517 U.S. 620. See supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Romer.
297. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. See supra notes 197-205 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Lawrence.
298. See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
299. See Richard A. Epstein, Liberty, Equality, and Privacy: Choosing a Legal Foundation for
Gay Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 73 (2002).
300. HABERMAS, supra note 6, at 15.
301. E.g., THOMAS MCCARTHY, IDEALS AND ILLUSIONS: ON RECONSTRUCTION AND
DECONSTRUCTrION IN CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL THEORY 140 (1993) (arguing that Habermas ig-
nores the cultural differences which could create different "ethical" conclusions).
302. HABERMAS, supra note 6, at 22-23.
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nity and adopt the perspective of all those possibly affected."3 °3 This
approach enables judges to consider not only their biases and the biases
of the legal and social system but also enables them to consider the lives
of those adversely affected. The "ought to" rationales are not part of the
moral-practical discourse.
To act immorally or unethically is to deny someone personhood. °5
Judges must respect persons' rights to act autonomously. Implicit in this
notion is that when an injury has occurred, reason needs to be applied.
To evaluate when injury has occurred, judges must overcome their as-
signed social memberships.3 6 It is often difficult to respect the person-
hood of others when entrenched in one's own social membership. Such
memberships create privileged status.30 7 Where there are individual self-
understandings that cannot be overcome, these differences must be given
full access in discourse, creating argumentation of a "maximally exhaus-
tive interpretation" and thereby minimizing the differences. 30 8 Argumen-
tation and discourse provide the "procedure for the exchange and as-
sessment of information, reasons, and terminologies. ' 3 9 Discourse must
be void of "impartial judgment of interpersonal practical conflicts" in
order to minimize inequities.310
Inequities are perpetuated by the implementation of objective rea-
soning, empirical proof and justifications.311 Habermas explains: "Moral
practical discourse detaches itself from the orientation to personal suc-
cess and one's own life to which both pragmatic and ethical reflection
remain tied. 312 In other words, morality and ethics embody the process,
through discourse, where rational ideas are played out and separated
from personally-motivated applications. The morals discussed by
Habermas entail the belief that society and the government seek to em-
ploy a non-discriminatory policy. In addition, ethical discourse should be
applied on an individual, legal basis because each problem "follow[s] a
unique logic of its own that had nothing to do with the logic of the next
problem." 313 Also, trying to implement logic that would be applied in
other scenarios creates a new problem of diversion. This is an interesting
premise that should be considered, yet I would add that the judiciary is
303. Id. at 24.
304. Id. at 40 (discussing that morals are not part of religious and metaphysical contexts, and
thus avoiding irrational justifications).
305. See id. at 58.
306. Id. at 45.
307. Id. at 46.
308. Id. at 58.
309. Id.
310. Id. at25.
311. Id. at 17, 30, 84 (arguing that "problems are always rooted in something objective").
312. Id. at 15 (rejecting the use of the word "ethics" in legal discourse to denote personal,
religious-based beliefs).
313. Id. at 17.
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working from the same legal basis that flows from the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clause.
Critics argue that judges, for example, are not motivated to use ethi-
cal discourse. Even if they did, Habermas fails to account for the cross-
cultural differences that result in no right answer. 14 Yet, due to the na-
ture of discourse, these cross-cultural differences will be minimized and
ethical decisions will be achieved. Further, the alternative is to normalize
norm-conformity, which guises the objectification of the problem.
315
This norm-conforming fuels inequities. Objectifying the problems also
creates "weak transcendental proof . [which] can only be placed in
[personal] interpretations.' 316 Therefore, to objectify is to employ irra-
tional, personal beliefs-precisely what critics fear by Habermas's ap-
proach.
A practical discourse model should be employed when judges
evaluate competing claims. Professor Ann Scales advances a similar ar-
317gument supporting the transcendence of inequalities. In order to over-
come personal conflicts that objectify the problem, a judge needs to be-
come more aware that neutrality is not possible.318 As Scales explains:
"Consciousness-raising exposes the points of view implicit in the objec-
tive norm, liberates participants in the process of consciousness raising
... and transforms what is meant by 'reality."' 319 In so doing, a judge
must also be particularly aware of the principle of equality and become
conscious of the oppressed persons' points of view. 320 This conscious-
ness is moral and ethical, and constitutionally permissible. Professor
Scales also supports the proposition that discourse needs to be applied on
a case-by-case basis. 321 In this way, transformation occurs, steadily hav-
ing the best strategic answers unfold as society begins to adopt and ac-
cept the new realities, making the legal reality a first step to social real-
ity.
322
D. Judicial Activism and Review of Fact Finding
There are many discussions taking place in the United States sur-
rounding judicial review, or as pundits seeking to maintain the status quo
like to argue-judicial activism. Whereas other countries struggle to
some extent with this topic, it has not become the political hot bed as in
314. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 301, at 135-40.
315. See id. at 135.
316. HABERMAS, supra note 6, at 84.
317. See generally Scales, supra note 235, at 10.
318. Id. "Better to relinquish neutrality as a surrogate fore justice, because the ideal of neutral-
ity obscures more than enhances the debate." Id.
319. Id. at 25 (citing Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CH. L. REV. 1, 65 (1988)).
320. Id. at 29.
321. Id.
322. See id. at 29-3 1.
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the United States. Some argue that the judiciary should just apply the
law as it stands, as if the law has but one interpretation. Others acknowl-
edge that there can be more than one interpretation. Therefore, the judi-
ciary needs to achieve neutrality so not to render an unfair judgment.
Some argue that society, and particularly the judiciary, cannot arrive
at the "right" answer. These opponents argue for objectivity. Yet,
"[o]bjectivity is the epistemological stance of which objectification is the
social process.- 32 3 In other words, no one is truly objective, and the act of
judging "objectively" objectifies that which is judged. The United States
has placed such a tremendous emphasis on this notion of a neutral arbi-
ter. In early cases, neutrality served us well since discrimination was
more overt. Now that prejudice and discrimination have found hiding
places in dark comers, the judiciary needs the tools to locate those biases,
and we should encourage their use. After all, the judicial role is to review
claims and redress harms.324
1. Judicial Review and Activism
I hesitate to rehash the judicial review discussions in great length,
so I offer just a few key points. The judge's role as interpreter will not be
effectively democratic unless she incorporates social, economic and po-
litical factors in understanding and interpreting the law.325 A judge must
be willing to examine the law within the context of the environmental
conditions surrounding the circumstances in which the law was made,
and who the law affects. 6 Legal precedence has a shelf life, and a judge
must actively overrule laws that no longer serve societal and constitu-
tional needs.327
The understanding that law is not made in a vacuum and must be
reviewed in light of its interrelationship with society has been apparent
since the very beginning of the U.S. legal system. 328 Professor Lawrence
Friedman sets forth a legal history that uncovers both local and national
intent to make law that fosters economic and social policy. 329 As eco-
nomic and social needs changed, legislative and judicial functions
changed.330 Old ideas were abandoned for a new or qualified approach
323. Not a Moral Issue, supra note 157, at 175 (referring to the objectification of women in
pornography and explaining that pornography cannot be judged objectively).
324. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 234, at 74 (explaining that the role of the judiciary is to redress
constitutional harms).
325. See generally BEN FIELD, ACTIVISM IN PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICE ROGER J. TRAYNOR 6 (2003).
326. Id. (citing Roger Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Guistizie: or Hard Cases Make Good
Law, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 223 (1962)).
327. See FIELD, supra note 325, at 6-7.
328. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 8.
329. See generally id. at 76-163.
330. See id. at 148-49 (explaining that legislation such as the Judiciary Act of 1789 codified the
judicial power of review and noting the controversy surrounding judicial review during the imple-
mentation of the Judiciary Act).
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that effectively met societal needs.331 The judicial role is to review and
uphold constitutional ideals as those ideals become more apparent to a
changing society.3 32  As a result, the law is not a fixed and immutable
concept between principles and fact-it is reactive.333 The law is a set of
workable rules that should stand only as long as they functionally fulfill
societal and constitutional goals.
334
The role of the judiciary is also reactive.335 Justice Traynor com-
bines a pragmatic, realist approach with judicial innovation to preserve
democracy. 336 In his approach, Traynor advocates for the use of "policy
analysis" and review of the "most current and available sociological
data."337 The Post-New Deal Era illustrates this reactive judicial role,
when constitutional ideology prevailed.338 Traynor examines the legal
harms affecting consumers, women and political participants, 339 and con-
cludes that the judge must determine a rational and objective outcome in
favor of the public interest in order to foster democratic ideals. ?
Often, constitutional principles conflict with public sentiment.341
Racial tensions epitomize this conflict between popular opinion and
equality. In 1947, Traynor opposed antimiscegenation laws, illustrating
judicial protection of constitutional principles despite strong contrary
public opinion.342 During the period from 1865 to 1970, a reported 1% of
couples were interracially married.343 Yet many U.S. Americans claimed
that interracial marriage would become commonplace and undermine the
331. See generally id. at 76-163.
332. See generally id. Sometimes those new ideas violated democratic ideals, and they were
eventually abandoned. Id. (referring to undemocratic legislation such as the Alien Act and Sedition
Act). The argument for separation of powers cuts both ways in that the legislative actions are subject
to review by the judiciary to effectively reconcile unnecessary restrictions on equality and liberty. It
is not that the judiciary must kowtow to the legislative branch because they are given explicit law
making powers. The very nature of judicial review is an active process which affects and alters
existing law. FIELD, supra note 325, at 121. (explaining how through interpreting the law, the judge
is an active oracle) (citing Roger Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1, 2
(1977)). See also Norman R. Williams, The Failings of Originalism: The Federal Courts and the
Power of Precedent, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 761, 816 (2004) (explaining that life tenure for judges
is "a necessary feature of a federal judiciary entrusted with the power and duty to invalidate legisla-
tive acts at variance with the Constitution (i.e., the power of judicial review))."
333. FIELD, supra note 325, at 7.
334. Id. at 7-8.
335. See id.
336. Id. Unlike Traynor, most realists reject the notion that any judge can be objective.
337. Id. at 8.
338. See generally id. at 16-18.
339. Id. at 17 (referring to Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711 (1948); DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal.
2d. 711 (1948); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d. 434 (1955); Escola v. Coca Cola, 24 Cal. 2d. 453
(1944); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d. 57 (1963)).
340. See FIELD, supra note 325 at 6-7.
341. Id. at 21.
342. Id. at 20-21. Traynor sat on the California Supreme Court when the state's antimiscegena-
tion statute was invalidated. See generally Perez, 32 Cal. 2d 711.
343. FIELD, supra note 325, at 21.
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344
privileges associated with the white race, and particularly white men.
In fact, ninety-two percent of western whites surveyed in a 1958 Gallup
poll opposed interracial marriage, sending a clear message that the public
did not support the legalization of marriage between blacks and
whites.345 Public sentiment should not be upheld when such sentiment
contradicts the principles of the Constitution.
Under a comparative harm analysis, a judge would have, in theory,
discovered that white males' alleged harm was a potential loss of power
and survival of his race whereas blacks claimed harm through the inequi-
table distribution of rights and privileges. 346 The sociological data would
suggest that the white men's claim was unreasonable, because only 1%
of the population was interracially married. This minute percentage un-
derscored the fact that the white race was not in jeopardy. Therefore,
inconsistency between alleged harm and fact existed.
Given that only 1% of marriages were interracial at the time, it
would be wholly unforeseeable that the remaining 99% of marriages
would somehow be jeopardized along with the white race. Even assum-
ing this harm was somehow legitimate, its resolution directly conflicts
with the constitutional notion of equality.347 The resolution of the harm
was inconsistent with equality principles, and therefore, the constitu-
tional rights of African-Americans were directly violated. By permitting
interracial marriage, whites are not suffering any constitutional depriva-
tion. Thus, their harm does not amount to a constitutional violation. In-
terracial marriage is a straightforward example where the harms are eas-
ily distinguishable, not only because hindsight permits clarity but also
because only one valid constitutional issue is presented.
Active judicial review also has its problems. One, legal instability
and "false, inconsistent legal patterns" could emerge when judges consis-
tently change the laws and reinterpret societal needs.348 This is more of a
fear than a reality, particularly if using Traynor's limitation on judicial
policy making. 349 Traynor argues for policy change when precedence is
outdated and no longer meeting society's needs, thus minimizing legal
instability. 350 During times of great societal change, the law will conse-
quently move through a period of change and instability. Some legal
344. Id. White men are distinguished here because most antimiscegenation laws said that black
men could not marry white women; thereby, protecting the white man's interest only.
345. Id.
346. The constitutional principles at issue are white men's First Amendment freedom of asso-
ciation and African-Americans' and females' interests in equality and also freedom of association.
347. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
348. FELD, supra note 325, at 126-27.
349. Id. at 126.
350. Id. at 126-27. This proposition also seems plausible considering there is little evidence to
suggest the Framers had a fixed idea of the role of precedence. Norman R. Williams, The Failings of




instability and change is evitable with legal interpretation and common
law.35' The facts of each case are not fixed or predetermined, and thus,
are expected to change constantly. To illustrate, equal protection of the
laws first applied to gender and racial disparities, and now to gays and
352lesbians. As a result, courts will not alter legal principles; they will
apply the fixed principles to the changing societal needs and fact pat-
terns. It is also unrealistic to expect Congress to always foresee and re-
solve constitutional problems through law-making.
The second problematic aspect of progressive judicial interpretation
concerns the separation of federal powers. Opponents of active judicial
review evoke a separation of powers argument, claiming that judges are
engaging in lawmaking by expanding laws to protect additional groups.
Opponents argue that the judiciary is not an elected body, and therefore,
it should not give unpopular or underrepresented groups constitutional
access because doing so expands the law.353 Historically, courts have
been the one check in the system that does protect unpopular groups be-
cause it does not sway with the masses, as most politicians do in seeking
reelection.354 Courts are not making law by declaring that an unpopular
or underrepresented group is entitled to constitutional access; instead, it
is reviewing the actions of state and federal legislatures and private ac-
tors for constitutional infringements. 355 Moreover, once competing
claims arise, the legislative and executive branches have already acted,
and the courts are attempting to bring clarity to or evaluate such actions
in a constitutional framework.
351. See generally id. at 805-15.
352. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 609 (holding that exclusive, all-male club
membership was unconstitutionally discriminatory, despite the male members' First and Fourteenth
amendment rights); Virginia v. Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating Virginia's law against inter-
racial marriage); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (invalidating a Texas anti-sodomy law as unconstitu-
tionally violative of the right to privacy).
353. See MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRrICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5-6 (1988) (critiquing judicial review from the perspective of liberal and
republican traditions).
354. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 1 (discussing the extreme public sentiment against inter-
racial marriage); see supra notes 341-45 and accompanying text; United States Dep't Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (allowing non-traditional "families" access to state benefits); Romer,
517 U.S. at 620 (protecting homosexuals despite voter support for Colorado's Amendment 2); Law-
rence, 539 U.S. at 558 (further protecting homosexuals' rights to privacy and certain intimate con-
tact).
355. A historical analysis of early American laws would establish that the interests of the
"smallholders," that is middle class property owners who were a "politically potent class" had a
great deal of influence over how the laws affected them as evidenced by the homestead exception.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 244-45. The middle class property owners, usually farmers, served an
important economic interest. Id. It was later evident that those without a political voice needed to be
protected by a federal system so that state and local laws did not unduly burden and punish those
without the power to advance within the legal system. Id. It was discovered that the politically weak
members of society were bad for the nation's economic and democratic interests, and laws emerged
to protect women, the poor and African-Americans. See id. at 391-488. The U.S. Supreme Court
either enforced or established many of these protectionist laws that are now commonplace. Id.
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On the one hand, the Constitution grants judicial power to review
legislative abuses that infringe on constitutional principles.1 6 On the
other hand, the judiciary is limited from creating law since the Constitu-
tion explicitly gives that power to the legislature. 357 Opponents of active
judicial review implore the use of the political question doctrine to pre-
vent the courts from deciding controversial issues. 358 When the courts do
decide issues that are deemed controversial, opponents claim that this is
law-making.359
In section two of this article, I explored reasons why some resist ex-
panding constitutional rights for groups who do not enjoy and benefit
from such rights. For example, in examining the political question doc-
trine, Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court in Baker v. Carr, created a
set of criteria that attempted to recast the political doctrine question so
not to prevent a number of disenfranchised groups from accessing the
constitutional pie.360 Justice Brennan's recast positioned the political
question doctrine as one decided almost exclusively as a separation of
powers matter.361 The Court sought to permit constitutional review par-
ticularly where the matter involved important constitutional rights.362 His
recast has been interpreted to maintain the status quo when the Court
finds an unusual need for adhering to the public policy so not to reverse
societal direction. 363 Those who seek to maintain the status quo are at-
tempting to prevent access to the Constitution, which is viewed as finite.
I concede that federalism and separation of powers are essential to the
U.S. republic. I just question when these principles are employed as limi-
tations in cases that involve the sharing of the constitutional pie with
those who do not enjoy full access.
364
356. See supra note 6.
357. See infra note 364.
358. See supra note 53.
359. See Daniel Levin, Federalists in the Attic: Original Intent, the Heritage Movement, and
Democratic Theory, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 105, 114-15 (2004).
360. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209-10 (1962).
361. PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURT AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-
STATE RELATIONS 434 (4th ed. Foundation Press 1998) (the political question doctrine has been
applied primarily in Guaranty Clause cases).
362. See id.
363. Id.
364. The Court is not the only one with limitations. The Constitution limits Congress from
reviewing constitutional claims. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I; U.S. CONST. art. 111. This is true
with one exception; Congress indirectly hears and reviews cases in its administrative courts. See
supra note 348. As the complexity of the U.S. legal system grew so did the need to develop a more
complex legislative and judicial body. FRtEDMAN, supra note 8, at 439-41. Congress's administra-
tive courts deal with finite legislative issues that require expertise in specific subject areas. Id. To
learn the subject matter every time a new issue presented itself would be an inefficient use of judicial
resources. See Levin, supra note 359.
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2. Review of Fact Finding
The Court is the expert on constitutional law.365 The judiciary has
and must continue to review findings of fact to determine whether in-
fringements are necessary on redress. The Court must do so in order to
determine whether the facts amount to a constitutional harm. Professor
Paul 0. Carrese explores why judicial power must include the authority
to evaluate findings.366 In reviewing the work of Montesquieu, Carrese
explores judicial power while discussing the importance of cloaking such
power under the guise of moderation.367 I use the word "guise" to articu-
late that Carrese, by discussing Alexander Hamilton's critique of Mon-
tesquieu, supports active judicial review but believes judicial review
must be "cloaked" by moderation to address potential fears that will in-
368evitably arise. Individuals become fearful of judicial activism because
they fear that politicking would encumber judging, according to Car-
rese.369 Those that fear active judicial review are concerned that they will
lose security and power in our finite constitutional scheme.370 Arguing on
behalf of Montesquieu, Carrese posits that the judiciary should reform
the laws quietly yet steadily.371 This approach seems to suggest that tol-
erance and equality of the laws should be done behind closed doors so
not to upset the masses who do not want to share the constitutional pie.
372
Whereas Professor Carrese's postulation supports judicial power, 73 his
approach does not foster sound societal ideals and in many ways per-
petuates inequality of the laws.
To review findings of fact requires a shift in power authorizing the
judiciary to evaluate sociological data and other "evidence. ' 374 The judi-
ciary must determine what is a "natural right" and "natural law" particu-
larly because "'the [modem] Supreme Court presides over the priority of
right.' ' 375 In order to determine what natural laws and rights are, the
Court must evaluate the prevailing sociological conditions. 37 6 It is per-
365. U.S. CONST. art. m. See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174-75 (1803).
366. See PAUL 0. CARRESE, THE CLOAKING OF POWER: MONTESQUIEU, BLACKSTONE, AND
THE RISE OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 6 (2003).
367. See id. at 2.
368. See id. at 7.
369. See id. at 17.
370. Id.
371. See id. This approach would probably have been possible during Hamilton's era although
it now seems impossible to address legal reform quietly, particularly when equal protection of the
law is at issue. Equal protection issues are often at the forefront of political campaigns which are
launched through television, radio and the Internet.
372. See id.
373. See id. at 258.
374. See id. at 240-41.
375. Id. at 258 (quoting MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH
OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 28 (2000)). Sandel challenges the new liberal reconstruction of judicial
review which claims that it is both natural and reasonable for there to be incompatible and pluralistic
constitutional doctrines. Sandel is correct insofar that his proposition supports the notion that the
Court must decide when certain rights will trump based on a case by case basis.
376. See id. at 240-41.
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fectly reasonable for the judiciary to determine whether the findings sup-
port a constitutional trump since the Court is the ultimate arbiter of the
Constitution. 377 This does not prohibit Congress from collecting evidence
to prepare legislation. The Court should nonetheless be free to review the
findings and determine whether they support a constitutional limitation
for particular individuals or groups. 378 The Court independently evalu-
ated the findings of fact to make its own determination in the Dormant
Commerce Clause 379 and pornography cases, to name just a few.380 The
Court is responsible for ensuring that the findings are relevant to and
bring forth the alleged harm, protecting constitutional rights. 381 This must
continue, and can be effectively furthered by a comparative harm analy-
sis.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court has not explicitly acknowledged when competing claims
exist, and has not developed a sufficient guideline for balancing them.
Instead, the Court relied upon feint causal demonstrations and morality
rhetoric to trump rights. The Court's harm analyses have failed to resolve
constitutional tensions. When the Court did not use conclusive reasoning
or require a demonstration of causative injury to step out of the constitu-
tional conundrum, it used "objective" tests to balance interests. This was
the Court's attempt to achieve neutrality so not to incorporate biases and
consequently perpetuate inequities.
To recapture the Court's flaws, in Virginia v. Black, the Court was
unable to identify and evaluate the harm with cross-burning. The plural-
ity was able to identify that possible riots or violence were harmful, but it
did not explicitly identify African-Americans or other targeted groups as
victims. The Court ignored the competing claims, and failed to resolve
the legal tension. Instead, the Court favored claims allegedly demonstrat-
ing a direct injury.
The Dormant Commerce Clause cases serve as an exception be-
cause the Court adequately identified and balanced competing claims.
The harm in commerce is more clearly identifiable and definitive unlike
the notion of harm to others. With harm to others, individuals and groups
seek to share the constitutional pie creating a backlash from those al-
ready enjoying the pie. In other words, there is more resistance when
377. Id. at 258 (explaining that "[t]he more realistic, progressive conception" of the judiciary
acknowledges: "Judges actually make new law, in large or small doses, case by case"). See also
supra notes 143-233 and accompanying text, emphasizing that the Court already determines consti-
tutional trumps as the Constitution's ultimate arbiter.
378. See CARRESE, supra note 366, at 241.
379. See also supra notes 206-37 and accompanying text.
380. See also supra note 377 and accompanying text.
381. The Justices of the Court possess the ultimate authority on the interpretation of the Consti-
tution, and the Court must check for constitutional infractions. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178.
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individuals and groups seek constitutional protection. There is little so-
cietal interest and bias when states compete in the interstate market.
Therefore, the greater 'alleged' clarity that exists in the Dormant Com-
merce Clause cases should be of no surprise.
A comparative harm analysis offers a way for the Court to more ex-
plicitly identify competing claims because it requires the explicit identi-
fication of harm. By explicitly identifying competing interests, the Court
ensures that valid constitutional claims are advanced. In pornography
cases implicating free speech, for example, the competing claim is harm
to women due to the objectification and oppression of females in porno-
graphic images. Pornographers are injured by being denied the right to
express a certain form of sexuality, arguably male sexuality. Once the
harm is identified, then the Court must determine which harm is more
important to guard against, and which remedy is more consistent with
constitutional principles. The Miller test does not account for competing
interests, nor does it balance them in a meaningful way.
I concede that social and political science data should be incorpo-
rated cautiously in helping the judiciary to reach a fair decision since
there are often inherent biases with such data. Sociological data will as-
sist the judiciary in determining whether the alleged harm is valid. For
example, sociological data was used to debunk the notion that interracial
marriage, if accepted, would become commonplace. Moreover, even if
interracial marriage did become commonplace, the resulting harm was
unclear other than potentially disrupting the status quo of whites.
When competing claims conflict, the alleged harm must be constitu-
tionally valid before the judiciary attempts to balance interests. Argu-
ments such as "interracial marriage will become commonplace" are not
constitutionally sound, and therefore, should not survive and abridge the
rights and liberties of others. By comparing harms, the judiciary will find
that often there are not two valid constitutional claims and will rarely be
faced with balancing legitimate, competing interests. A comparative
harm analysis will, and should, focus on whether the claims brought
forth are actual constitutional claims; thereby, eliminating the need for
so-called objective, causative analyses in the majority of cases. Where
legitimate competing claims exist, the courts must balance constitutional
interests. In these few incidences where two constitutional claims are
presented, some rights will be trumped in favor of other rights. How to
evaluate and trump certain rights is left for another conversation. Yet, in
striking this balance, the legislature need not be precluded from entering
the competing rights discussion so long as it does not attempt to encroach
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upon the judicial role and amass enough constitutional authority to effec-
382tively destroy the integrity of the separation of powers doctrine.
The judiciary should evaluate and balance competing harms by en-
gaging in practical discourse. Discourse, in theory, will enable the courts
to transcend personal biases and employ well-grounded reason. Further,
practical discourse requires the judiciary to view the injury from the vic-
tim's perspective. The courts should also ensure that the "remedy" will
resolve the harm in a meaningful way and will not contradict constitu-
tional principles. This responsibility rests with the federal courts, and
particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, because it is the supreme arbiter of
constitutional law. Because the courts review constitutional rights, the
courts should also review limitations on those rights. Discourse is essen-
tial in order to overcome inequities and the propensity to deny liberties
for less powerful groups.
However, discourse does not guarantee that the courts will reach an
unbiased decision in every incidence. In other words, the courts will
reach the wrong conclusions occasionally and will need to remedy these
wrongs when more information becomes available. Error cannot and
perhaps should not be avoided. Neutrality pretends misjudgment does not
exist whereas discourse examines the opportunity for misjudgment. It is
also important to emphasize that litigation is just one of the first steps in
the long uphill struggle for equality and liberty; yet, litigation is an im-
portant step for it sets standards to address the constitutional conflict that
was overlooked or encouraged by the other branches of government, and
rights the immediate wrong.
382. It is unlikely that the legislature will attempt to amass the necessary authority for constitu-
tional review since in a survey administered to congressional members asking whether they believe
they are in a better position to interpret the Constitution than the judiciary, they overwhelmingly
agreed that the judiciary is better equipped for constitutional interpretation. See Bruce G. Peabody,
Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry into Legislative
Attitudes, 1959-2001, 29 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 127, 165, 168 (2004) (discussing the survey results
indicating that the majority of Congress members and/or their staff believe that the courts are in a
better position to interpret the Constitution.).
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